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RECENT CASE NOTES
corporation resides or carries on its business, for the enforcement of its
order." Idem.
Also it is provided that "any party required by such order of the commission to cease and desist from using such methods of competition may
obtain a review of such order in said circuit court of appeals by filing in
the court a written petition praying that the order of the commission be
set aside." 15 USCA, Sec. 45.
Substantially the same words are applied to orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Federal Reserve Board. 15 USCA, Sec. 21.
Review of a decision of a district court of the United States within one
of the said States shall be in the circuit court of appeals for the circuit
embracing the particular state. 28 USCA, Sec. 225, par. (d).
No attempt is here made to outline the appellate jurisdiction of the
circuit courts in regard to decisions of United States courts outside the
United States, such as the district courts for Alaska, the Virgin Islands,
the Canal Zone, the Supreme Courts of the Territory of Hawaii and of
Porto Rico, or the United States Court for China. Said jurisdiction may
be readily traced by referring to 28 USCA, Sec. 225.
In view of this brief summary of the statutes, the principal case was
easily and correctly decided. The statutes provided that in such case as
this the decree of the district court must be a final one. That this is indispensable has been held by O'Brien v. Lashar, 266 Fed. 215; Crooker v.
Knudsen, 232 Fed. 857; McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, and countless others.
This leaves the sole question as to whether a reference to a master as in
the principal case constitutes a final decree.
"The rule . . .for determining whether, for the purposes of an appeal,
a decree is final, is, in brief, whether the decree disposes of the entire controversy between the parties." La Bourgogne, 210 U. S.95, 28 S. Ct. 664.
On the other hand, a "final decree" is not necessarily the last order in a
case, as orders sometimes follow merely for the purpose of carrying out
or executing the matters which the decree has determined; but when it
finally fixes the rights of the parties, it is final. Gas and Electric Securities Co. v. Manhattanand Queens Traction Corp., 266 Fed. 625, 632. Here,
however, there was something more than a mere carrying into effect the
terms of a complete decree. The reference to the master was to determine
by an accounting what the defendant was to pay, and said accounting was
subject to the approval of the court. In such cases it has been consistently
held that although it has already been decreed that the defendant is liable,
such decree does not determine the extent of the plaintiff's rights, and is
not final. Parsons v. Robinson, 122 U. S. 112; Lodge v. Twell, 135 U. S.
232, 10, S. Ct. 745; Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U. S. 524, 14 S. Ct. 201; Macfarland v. Brown, 187 U. S. 239, 23 S. Ct. 105.
P. J. D.

RECEIVERS-APPOINTMENT WITHOUT NOTICE-SUFFICIENT CAUSE-Plaintiff filed amended verified complaint seeking appointment of a receiver for
defendant. Defendant was not served with summons. A receiver was appointed on the day the amended complaint was filed, and furnished bond
for $1000 which was approved. Defendant filed exceptions to the appointment of receiver without notice. Appointment set aside. The court de-
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clared oral evidence inadmissible and that the only competent evidence to
be considered was the varified complaint since no supporting affidavits were
filed; that allegations of conclusions were insufficient under Burn's Ann.
Stat., Sec. 1301 to show sufficient cause for appointment without notice;
that a receiver should not be appointed without notice where a temporary
restraining order or other relief would protect plaintiff until notice could
be given and a hearing had; that the facts alleged by plaintiff that president of defendant who was also manager, wrongfully paid out funds, that
only security for plaintiff's debt from defendant was the income which
would be wasted unless receiver was appointed does not show that a temporary restraining order would not protect plaintiff. Ind. Merchants Protective Assoc., Inc. v. Little, Supreme Court of Indiana, 172 N. E. 905.
The statutory to appoint receivers without notice is derived from Burns
Ann. Stat. 1926, sec. 1301. The court has the power if sufficient cause is
shown. "Sufficient cause" is not defined in the Statute. The exercise of the
power is within the discretion of the court subject to the judicial determination of what constitutes sufficient cause. On review, the Supreme Court
has been extremely reluctant to sustain an appointment of receiver without
notice. Continental Clay & Mining Co. v. Bryson, 148 Ind. 485, 81 N. E.
210; Steel's Dept. Stores v. Buckingham, 123 A. 391, 143 Md. 680; Beack,
Receivers, Sec. 134; 23 Ruling Case Law p. 39.
A review of the Indiana cases shows that the courts have considered
that the following were essential allegations of fact in the various cases
to establish sufficient cause:
I. That a necessity for appointment of receiver exists.
II. That a necessity for appointment of receiver without notice" exists;
A. Because of emergency or imperious necessity requiring immediate action due to:
(1) Fraud-secretion of property to defeat creditors.
(2) Property being wasted, misappropriated or removed
from the jurisdiction.
(3) Delay necessary to giving notice would defeat the relief sought and cause irreparable injury.
(4) Notice itself would defeat the relief sought.
(5) Threatened actions by creditors whereby the assets
would be wasted in fruitless litigation.
(6) Judgment creditors intended levying execution before
notice could be given and hearing had (necessary to
set out the amounts of the judgments).
B. Defendant beyond jurisdiction or not to be found (concealing
himself).
C. Temporary restraining order or other relief ineffective to protect plaintiff and the property.
Verification of complaint and affidavits must be in positive terms (insufficient if merely on belief of party making. Marshall v. Matson, 171 Ind.
250, 86 N. E. 339). See: Chicago & S. E. R. R. v. Cason, 132 Ind. 49, 133
N. E. 822; Wabash R. R. v. Dyheman, 133 Ind. 56, 53 N. E. 823; Continental Clay & Mining Co. v. Bryson, supra; Henderson v. Reynolds, 168 Ind.
485, 41 N. E. 210; Marshall v. Matson, 171 Ind. 250, 86 N. E. 339; Ryder
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v. Shea, 183 Ind. 18, 108 N. E. 104; Kent Ave. Groc. v. Geo. Hitz & Co., 187
Ind. 120 N. E. 659; Oren Jessup Land Co. v. Lannes, 193 Ind. 644, 141
N. E. 454, Ledger Pub. Co. v. Scott, 193 Ind. 683, 141 N. E. 609; Tucker
v.: Tucker, 194 Ind. 108, 142 N. E. 11. In Steel's Dept. Store v. Buckingham,
supra, the Court said, "No principle is more firmly inbedded in the law
than that, courts ought not to appoint receivers on ex parte application except on clearest and most satisfactory showing that only so can the interests of justice be served." In Kolb Coal Co. v. Sauter, 295 Fed. 640, it was
said "a receiver is never appointed without notice unless it is made to appear clearly that substantial and irreparable injury will probably accrue
to the moving party unless order for receivership be made without notice."
See also Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Hobart, 244 Fed. 385.

